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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A-123 (84-320)

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CROW TRIBE
OF I;:u..o~~~~

ber 10

(

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, Circuit Justice.
Applicants National Fanners Union Insurance Companies
and Lodge Grass School District No. 27 request that I stay
the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit which reversed the judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Montana. The latter
court had enjoined the Crow. Tribe of Indians from executing
against the applicants on a judgment rendered by the Crow
Tribal Court. ~e C2~ of A~m.eals for the Ninth Circuit
held, as I read its opiruon, tl!!.t litigants who seek to chalJen~ercise of jurisdiction by an Indian Tribal Court in
a ciVil i.di:on have no federal court remedy of any kind. I
have concluded that four Members of this Court are likely to
vote to grant the applicants' petition for certiorari, and that
the appli ts have a reasonable probability for at least partial sue ess on the merits t · Court grants certiorari. I
have therefore decided that the temporary stay I earlier ~
granted on August 21, 1984, pending consideration of a re- 0'
sponse, should be continued until this Court disposes of the
applicants' petition for certiorari which was filed on August
29th.
In May, 1981, Leroy Sage, a Crow Indian school child, was
struck by an uninsured motorcyclist on the property owned
by applicant School District. The school is located on land
within the external boundaries of the Crow Indian Reserva-
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tion, but the land is owned by the State of Montana in fee
subject to a reserved mineral interest in the Tribe. Sage
sustained a broken leg, and filed suit against the School District in Crow Tribal Court.
Dexter Falls Down served process for Sage upon Wesley
Falls Down; Wesley was a member of the school board.
Wesley did not notify anyone of the summons and a default
judgment for $153,000 was entered against the school three
weeks later in Tribal Court. Actual medical bills carne to
$3,000. Petitioners became aware of the suit when the
Tribal Court mailed a copy of the judgment to the school.
Instead of seeking review of the default judgment in Tribal
Court, applicants filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Montana, alleging that the Tribal
Court's exercise of jurisdiction violated Due Process and the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U. S. C. § 1302, et seq. (1982).
Petitioners sought a pennanent injunction against the execution of the Tribal Court judgment.
The District Court held that petitioners' complaint, based
on federal common law, stated a claim under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1331 (1982). National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 360 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (D. Mont.
1983). The District Court held that the Tribal Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Sage's claim, because the
land upon which the court had occurred was not Indian land,
and the defendants were not tribal members. The District
Court relied on our decision in Montana v. United States, 450
U. S. 544, 565-66 (1981) in reaching this conclusion.
The Tribe appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 1 A
Circuit, and that court reversed over a partial dissent. National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F. 2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals
reasoned on the authority of one of its prior decisions that
"Indian tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment." It went on to determine that
tribes are bound by the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights
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Act, 25 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. and that § 1302(8) of this Act
requires that tribal courts exercise their jurisdiction in a
manner consistent with due process and equal protection.
But the court then concluded that since Congress had expressly limited federal court review of a claimed violation of
the ICRA to a single remedy-the writ of habeas corpusthere could be no federal court review of any tribal court exercise of jurisdiction in a civil case. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit relied in part on our decision in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 66-70 (1977) to reach
this conclusion. The Court of Appeals recognized that our
decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S.
191 (1978) had relied on principles of federal common law to
determine whether a tribal court had exceeded its jurisdiction, but decided that our opinion the same term in Santa
Clara Pueblo, supra, suggested a restriction on federal court
review of Indian tribal jurisdiction as a result of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. The Court of Appeals observed in a footnote that "should Sage seek to enforce his default judgment ·
in the courts of Montana, National may, of course, challenge
the Tribal Court's jurisdiction in the collateral proceedings.
See generally Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106 (1963)." 736 F.
2d 1320, 1324 n. 5.
It is clear from proceedings in this case subsequent to the
handing dOwn of the opinion of the Court of Appeals that
the
,..-----..respondents in this case have no intention of resorting to any
s~roc eaiilg§ in order to eruorce the judgment of
the Crow Tri al ourt.
ter e suance of the man ate of
the ~ppeals, tribal officials, at the behest of respondent Sage, seized 12 computer terminals, other computer equipment, and a truck from the school district. The
basis for this seizure was said to be the Tribal Court judgment, and no state process was invoked.
If the Court of Appeals is correct in the conclusions whicpt'n
it drew in its opinion, the state of the law respecting revie~
of jurisdictional excesses on the part of Indian tribal courts is

"

/
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indeed anomalous. The Court of Appeals may well be correct that tripal ~ourts are not constrained by the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment;
long ag:o, this Court said in United States v. Kagama, 118
U. S. 375, 379 (1886), and repeated the statement as recently
as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 211
(1978):
"Indians are within the geographical limits of the United
States. · The soil and people within these limits are
under the political control of the Government of the
United States, or the States of the Union. There exists
in the broad domain of a sovereignty but these two."
But if because only the national and state governments exercise true sovereignty, and are therefore subject to the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, I cannot believe that
Indian tribal courts are nonetheless free to exercise their
jurisdiction in a manner prohibited by the decisions of this
Court, and that a litigant who is the subject of such an exercise of jurisdiction has-nowhere at--all to turn for relief from a
conceded excess. -Every final decision of the highest court of
a state in which such a decision may be had is subject to review by this Court on either certiorari or appeal. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257 (1982). Every decision of a United States District
Court or of a court of appeals is reviewable by this Court
either by way of appeal or by certiorari. ld., §§ 1252-54;
cf. § 1291. If the courts of the states, which in common with
the national government exercise the only true sovereignty
exercised within our Nation, Kagama, supra, are to have
their judgments reviewed by this Court on a claim of erroneous decision of a federal question, it is anomalous that no federal court, to say nothing of a state court, may review a judgment of an Indian tribal court which likewise erroneously
decides a federal question as to the extent of its jurisdiction.
See Montana v. United States, supra. It may be that Congress could provide for such a result, but I have a good deal
more doubt than did the Court of Appeals that it has done so.

l
(

(

:

'
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Our decision in Santa Claro Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S.
49 (1978), which the Court of Appeals read to support its conclusion, raised the question of whether a federal court could
pass on the validity of an Indian Tribe's ordinance denying
membership to the children of certain female tribal members.
We held that the Indian Civil Rights Act, supra, did not
imply a private cause of action to redress violations of the
statutory Bill of Rights contained in the Act, and that therefore the validity of the tribal ordinance regulating membership could not be reviewed in federal court. It seems to me
that this holding, relating as it did to the relationship between the right of a Tribe to regulate its own membership
and the claims of those who had been denied membership, is
quite distinguishable from a claim on the part of a non-Indian
that a tribal court. has exceeded the bounds of tribal jurisdiction as enunciated in such decisions of this Court as Montana
v. United States, supra. As JUSTICE WHITE pointed out in
his dissent in that case, 436 U. S. 72-73, "the declared purpose of the Indian Civil Rights Act . . . is 'to ensure that the
American Indian is afforded the broad constitutional rights
secured to other Americans.' But as the Court also pointed
out in its opinion, Congress entertained the additional purpose of promoting 'the well-established federal "policy'' of
furthering Indian self-Government."' 436 U. S. 49, 62.
The facts as well as the holding of Santa Claro Pueblo,
supra, satisfy me that Congress' concern in enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act was to enlarge the rights of individual
Indians as against the Tribe while not unduly infringing on
the right of tribal self-government. The fact that no private
civil cause of action is to be implied under the Indian Civil
Rights Act, Santa Claro Pueblo, supra, does not to my mind
foreclose the likelihood that federal jurisdiction may be invoked by one who claims to have suffered from an excess beyond federally prescribed jurisdictional limits of an Indian
tribal court on the basis of federal common law. See, e. g.,

:

•i
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Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 99-100 (1972).
We said in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, supra:
"'Indian law' draws principally on the treaties drawn and
executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed
by Congress. These instruments, which beyond their
actual text form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of the common notions of
the day and the assumptions of those who drafted them."

(

I think a fair reading of all of our case law on this subject
could lead to the conclusion that even though the Indian Civil
Rights Act affords no private civil cause of action to one
claiming a violation of its terms, "Indian law'' as of the time
that law was enacted afforded a basis for review of tribal
court judgments claimed to be in excess of Tribal Court
jurisdiction.
Respondents insist that under Rule 44.2 of this Court a supersedeas bond should have accompanied applicant's request
for a stay. That rule provides:
"If the stay is to act as a supersedeas, a supersedeas
bond shall accompany the motion and shall have such
surety or sureties as said judge, court or justice may
require.,
I do not think that the rule is by its terms applicable to this
case. The term "supersedeas" to me suggests the order of
an appellate court having authority to review on direct appeal the judgment which is superseded. All of the proceedings in the various federal courts in this case have, of course,
sought no direct review of the Tribal Court judgment, which
simply is not provided for by statute at all, but collateral relief. The District Court did not review the judgment of the
Indian Tribal Court by way of appeal, but instead enjoined its
enforcement.
It may well be that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure respondents would have a plausible argument to make

(
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to the District Court that an injunction bond serving somewhat the same purposes as a supersedeas bond should be required by that court so long as its injunction remains in
effect. Whether such a bond should be required of either
party in this case, and whether in particular it should be required of applicant Lodge Grass School District No. 27 in
view of the fact that apparently under Montana law a public
body is not required to post a supersedeas bond in a state
court proceeding, is an issue best left in the first instance to
the District Court.
As to whether, if I am right in thinking that this Court may
well decide that Tribal Court judgments are subject to federal court review for claims of jurisdictional excess, applicants would necessarily prevail, I express no opinion. The
District Court held in their favor on this point, but the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found no necessity for reaching it since it held that there was no federal jurisdiction to
consider it. The District Court in its opinion quoted F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 253 (1982 Ed.), to the
effect that "the extent of Tribal civil jurisdiction over the
non-Indian is not fully determined." The District Court, in
reaching the conclusion it did, relied on the following language from our opinion in United States v. Montana:
"To be sure, Indian Tribes retain inherent sovereign
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians on the Reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands. A Tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who
enter consensual relationships with the Tribe or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements. A Tribe may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation when the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe." Montana, supra, 450 U. S., at 565-566.

(

:

(
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The court concluded that exercise of tribal jurisdiction over
an injury to a tribal member occurring on non-Indian owned
fee land within the boundaries of the Reservation was not
within the description of Indian tribal jurisdiction. I express
no opinion as to what the correct answer to this inquiry may
be. I do think its correct decision is of far less importance
than the correct decision of the more fundamental question of
whether there is any federal court review available to nonIndians for excesses of Tribal Court jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.

(
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

(

November 21, 1984, Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
No. 84-320
Nat'l~s Un.
Co. et: al. ~

Cert to CA9 (Wright [cone.&
dis.], Anderson, Fletcher)

Ins.

--

v.

~

Crow

Trib~
1.

SUMMARY:

court remedy for

Federal/Civil

The CA9 held

Timely

below that there is no federal

non-Indian litigants who seek to challenge the

exercise of civil jurisdiction by an Indian tribal court.

In an

in-chambers opinion granting petrs' ap lication for a stay of the

(

CA9's mandate pending this Court's r

'--- Gsrru.d::-

CA9 ""~ have ma.de. a.

~sd.lc..lc·oV\_~ ~~.

.. -

...

. LtrutQ

ing on the petn for certio-
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0
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c...el.U\X
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''I

rari,
for

Justice Rehnquist

the CA9

reviewed

opinion and

the

concluded

facts and

that

four

the

Justices would

likely to vote to grant this petn for certiorari.
ers

Union

Insurance

Cos.

v.

Crow Tribe

of

legal basis
be

National Farm-

Indians,

No.

A-123

(slip op. September 10, 1984) (copy attac h ed).
This case is straight-1 ined with R. J. Wi 11 iams Co. v. Fort
Belknap Housing Authority,

No.

83-1811.

The Williams case,

on

which the CA9 relied in part in its decision in this case, is the
subject

of

a

previously circulated and

thorough

copy of that pool memo is also attached.
have

subsequently

moved

to

pool memo.

A

The petrs in Williams

consolidate

consideration

of

their

case with National Farmers Union; the motion for consolidation is
the subject of a separate accompanying memo.

(

2.
tr ict

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

No.

27,

a

Montana

Petr Lodge Grass School Dis-

governmental

unit,

operates

a

school

within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation on land ceded

to

Farmers

the

state by resp Crow Tribe of

Union

Insurance Companies

Indians.

issued

a

Petr National

liability

insurance

policy to the school district.
In May, 1981, resp Leroy Sage, a student at the school, was
struck by a motorcycle
guardian,

in the school parking lot.

Through his

Resp Flora Not Afraid, Sage brought a negligence suit

against the school district in resp Crow Tribal Court.
was

served on

notify

(

the

the chairman of

other

entered a default

members.

The

judgment for

Process

the school board, who failed
Crow Tribal
Sage

Court

to

subsequently

in the amount of $153,000.

The Tribal Court mailed a notice of the judgment to the school.

- 3 -

Rather than filing a motion to set aside the default judgment in
Crow Tribal Court pursuant to the Crow Rules of Civil Procedure,
petrs

sought

injunctive

relief

in

U.S.

District

Court

on

the

grounds that the tribal court's exercise of jurisidiction violated

due

process

u.s.c.

and

the

Indian

Ci vi 1

Rights

Act

( "ICRA") ,

25

§1302.

The DC (Battin, C.J., D. Mont.)

ruled for the petrs, and on

December 29, 1982, entered a permanent injunction precluding enforcement of the Tribal Court judgment.
at 213.

Petn at 14a, 360 F.Supp.

Judge Battin reasoned that he had jurisdiction under 28

u.s.c.

§1331 to determine whether the Tribal Court had exceeded

the lawful limits of its jurisdiction in entering a default judg-

(

ment

against

u.s.

544

the

(1981),

petrs.

Citing Montana v.

United States,

450

the DC concluded that federal authority to de-

termine the extent of tribal sovereignity is a matter of federal
common law.
91

(1972),

under

the DC concluded

§1331

Petn at
court

And citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,

17a.

can

be

On

based

that

on

questions

the merits,

lacked subject matter

federal question
of

jurisdiction

federal

the DC concluded

406 U.S.

common

that

the

law.

tribal

jurisdiction because the defendants

were non-Indians and the accident took place on non-Indian land.
Judge Battin concluded that the proper forum for this tort claim
was Montana state court.

Petn at 24a.

In light of these hold-

ings, the DC found it unnecessary to reach petrs claims under the
ICRA.

(

Petn at 18a.
On July 3, 1984, the CA9 reversed the DC in a brief opinion

by Judge Fletcher.

Petn at la; 736 F.2d at 1320.

Judge Fletch-

- 4 -

er's opinion noted that the Circuit's previous decision in R.J.
Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979 (CA9
1983), "held that a complaint challenging a tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant in a civil suit
stated no federal claim for relief."

Petn at 4a.

Finding Wil-

liams controlling, the panel reversed Judge Battin.

A subsequent

portion of Judge Fletcher's opinion, labelled "Discussion", noted
that

(1)

due process and equal protection claims against Indian

tribal courts do not arise under the Constitution because Indian
tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the Fourth Amendment

(citing Williams);

(2)

although Indian tribes are required

by ICRA to exercise their powers in a manner consistent with due
process

and

equal

protection,

federal

court

review of

alleged

I

(

ICRA violations is limited to the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus

(citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49

(1978)).

The CA9 refused to recognize a civil cause of action at federal
common

law

to

review alleged

j ur isd iction by
holding
petrs

made
had

Court.

it

tribal

courts.

unnecessary

exhausted

improprieties

their

to

in

Judge Fletcher
reach

available

the

the

noted that

question

remedies

exercise of

in

of
Crow

this

whether
Tribal

Petn at 7a n.4.

Judge Wright dissented in part and concurred in the result.
Petn at 8a.

He would hold that the petrs stated a federal common

law cause of action,

but would dismiss their case because they

had failed to exhaust tribal court remedies.

(

First, Judge Wright

noted that Santa Clara Pueblo and other cases cited by the majority did not necessarily require that courts preclude federal com-
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mon law jurisdiction to review a tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction in a civil case.

He noted that cases permitting re-

view of tribal regulatory decisions on that grounds, see, e.g.,
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

455

u.s. 130 (1982), should

logically extend to review of the exercise of jurisdiction by a
tribal court.

Second, Judge Wright noted that the Williams deci-

sion did not control in this case because petr there did not asseit

federal

common

law

as

a

basis

for

jurisdiction.

Third,

Judge Wright noted that the effect of the majority's ruling would
be to make the Crow Tribal Court the final arbiter of its civil
jurisdiction.

Finally, he concluded that the case should never-

theless be dismissed because petrs had failed to exhaust available

tribal

remedies

under

the Crow Rules of Civil Procedure.

(

\

Because petrs attempted to circumvent the tribal court system by
suing immediately in federal court, Judge Wright would deny them
relief.
After the CA9 opinion was issued, resp Sage seized various
assets of the resp school district,

including a truck and some

computer terminals, pursuant to tribal court process.

A judicial

sale of the property was authorized by the tribal court for August 23, 1984.

On August 22, 1984, petrs for the first time en-

tered an appearance in tribal court and moved to set aside the
default judgment.

Crow Tribe Resp Brief at la.

Pursuant to Crow

Rules of Civil Procedure, the tribal court then stayed the sale
and ordered petrs to post a surety bond pending a decision on the

(

motion.
1984.

A hearing on the motion was scheduled for September 19,
In the interim, Justice Rehnquist stayed the issuance of

- 6 -

the CA9 mandate.
Tribe of

National Farmers Union Insurance Cos.

Indians,

attached).

No.

A-123

(slip op.

September 10,

v.

Crow

1984) (copy

The tribal court accordingly stayed the sale indefi-

nitely, Crow Tribe Resp Brief at Sa.

The ~ribal court went ahead

with the hearing on the motion to set aside the default judgment,
but petrs refused to attend.
3.

Crow Tribe Resp Brief at 13a.

In addition to the petn, resp briefs have

CONTENTIONS:

been filed by the Crow Tribe of Indians and by resps Sage and Not
Afraid.

Three

amicus

briefs

have

been

states and Glacier County, Montana,

filed

on behalf of

supporting the petn.

ten

Petrs

also filed a reply brief on November 8, 1984.
Petrs contend that the CA9 opinion has far-reaching consequences
I

\

in

denying

federal

courts

any

power

to

Indians from abuse of tribal court jurisdiction.
v.

Montana,

court

civil

supra,

450

u.s.

at

jurisdiction over

564-66,

protect

United States

suggested

non-Indians

would

non-

be

that

tribal

limited

to

those cases involving non-Indians who enter into consensual relations with the tribe and to protection of the political integrity,

economic security, or health or welfare of the tribe.

The

CA9 opinion forecloses any contraint on tribal jurisidiction despite the Montana suggestion that such jurisdiction is limited.
The CA9 opinion should be promptly reviewed because of the pervasive

involvement of non-Indians

-- and

particularly non-Indian

governmental units like petr -- on Indian reservations.
alone operates

(

47

Montana

school districts on Indian reservations,

and

all may be subject to unreviewable assertions of civil jurisdiction in numerous tribal courts.

Finally,

petr notes that Santa

- 7 -

Clara Pueblo,

supra,

436 U.S. at 51-52, addressed only the role

of federal causes of action to enforce the ICRA in the context of
an inter-tribal dispute, and not the existence of a federal cornrnon law cause of action to challenge tribal court civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian.
The

Amici

contend

that

the

CA9

opinion

is

incorrect

and

threatens the relationships between Indian tribes and state governrnents and private businesses.

An amicus brief filed on behalf

of nine states 1 notes that each of the states and their subdivisions provide a
reservations.

variety of governmental services within Indian

They are concerned that, without a federal common

law cause of action to challenge a tribe's improper assertion of
civil jurisdiction over state agencies, state property and servI

\

ices on reservations will be endangered.

The states further note

that the federally developed doctrine of tribal sovereignity cannot

be construed

to authorize unreviewable assertions of civil

jurisdiction over non-Indians.

In a separate amicus brief,

the

State of Washington notes that 16,000 non-Indian Washington citizens reside on Indian reservations in that state, and are provided state services by a variety of governmental entities, including 40 school districts.

These persons have no voice in tribal

affairs, yet under the CA9 holding they will have no way to challenge the tribe's assertion of civil jurisdiction over them.
a

(

third

amicus

brief,

Glacier

County,

Montana argues

1 Montana, Arizona, Minnesota, North Dakota, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

that

In
the

- 8 -

Blackfeet Tribal Court has recently enjoined the County Water and
Sewer District from terminating water or sewage service to nonpaying members of the tribe.
County argues,

Under the CA9 decision below, the

this sort of injunction will be unreviewable in

any other court.

The County provides sewer service and . a variety

of other services on the reservation by state mandate rather than
by choice.
Resp Crow Tribe contends that the CA9 opinion is correct as
a matter of law and that review is particularly unwarranted because the petrs have failed to exhaust the significant remedies
available to them in the tribal court.
Pueblo, supra, 436

u.s.

Petr cites Santa Clara

at 63, for the proposition that federal

review of tribal court assertions of civil jurisdiction must be
\

precluded in order to protect tribal sovereignity from undue interference.
brief

Crow Tribe Resp at 6, 13-16.

argues

that petr s

The bulk of this resp

intentionally circumvented

the

tribal

court in seeking an injunction in federal court prior to attempting to have the default judgment set aside in Crow Tribal Court.
Sensible not ions of comity and respect for

tribal sovere igni ty

suggest that, even if there is a federal common law cause of action to review tribal exercise of jurisdiction, non-Indians be
required to exhaust tribal court remedies before appealing to a
federal court.
gests that,

Crow Tribe Resp at 7-13.

The tribe finally sug-

in the event the petn is granted, the Court should

not reach the merits of whether the tribal court has jurisdiction

(

in this case, but should only decide whether a a federal cause of
action exists.

- 9 -

Resps Sage and Not Afraid repeat arguments made by resp Crow
Tribe concerning the Santa Clara Pueblo case and petrs' failure
to exhaust

tribal court

remedies.

They emphasize

that petrs'

resort to federal court without any appearance in tribal court
has caused Sage and Not Afraid to incur three years of delay in
obtaining relief on their claim and more than $45,000 in legal
fees.

Sage and Not Afraid seek leave to proceed in forma paupe-

ris, and they have filed an appropriate affidavit indicating they
have no assets and are unemployed.
Petrs Reply Brief argues that this Court should review both
the question of whether there exists a federal cause of action to
review tribal court exercise of jurisdiction and the question of
whether tribal court jurisdiction was proper in this case.

(

note that the CA9 opinion held
court

remedies was

tained

federal

remedies.

irrelevant,

that failure

Petrs

to exhaust tribal

since petrs could not have ob-

review even if they had exhausted tribal court

Resps'

"exhaustion"

argument

accordingly

does

not

lessen the merit of the petn.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The Court should grant the petn on both

questions presented.

The CA9 ruling -- that federal courts can

never review the exercise of civil jurisdiction by a tribal court
over a non-Indian -- is unfortunate and was clearly unnecessary
to decide the case.

The CA9 reading of Santa Clara Pueblo ex-

tends that case far beyond reason or the Court's apparent intent.
Judge Wright's partial dissent is eminently reasonable and sug-

(

gests an appropriate accommodation of the need to protect the
integrity of

tribal court proceedings and the need to protect

- 10 -

non-Indians
courts.

against

assertions of civil

jurisdiction by

tribal

By resorting to federal court prior to seeking to vacate

the default judgment in tribal court,

petrs circumvented estab-

lished procedures in that court and successfully delayed resolution of the merits of their claims for more than two years.
the

CA9

merely

rejected

petrs

suit

on

the

grounds

of

Had
non-

exhaustion, this case would probably not be certworthy.
But because the CA9 instead announced that tribal courts can
define their own jurisdiction over non-Indians without any federal court review, this Court will have to straighten out the mess.
The case lends itself to elucidation of both a federal common law
action

challenging

tribal court

jurisdiction and

a

requirement

that litigants exhaust tribal remedies before resort to federal

(

court.

As noted

in the accompanying memo,

I

further

recommend

that the Williams case, which is straight-lined with this one, be
held pending resolution of this case.

The CA9 reasoning and re-

sult in Williams are less outrageous than in this case, and can
be distinguished since petrs there failed to invoke federal common law.

Nevertheless, any opinion in this case may require the

CA9 to reevaluate Williams.

I recommend a GRANT.

There are two responses, three amicus briefs, and a reply.
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This case presents the following question:
.. Whether the Tribal Court of the Crow
Indian reservation has jurisdiction over claims
that involve the State of Montana
(or its
subdivisions}, that arise on State-owned land,
and that occur in connection with activities
that are compelled or encouraged by State and
Federal law or policy ...
The

facts

in

this case are unusal.

Leroy

Sage,

a

member of the Crow Tribe and a minor, was injured on the
parking

lot

of

Lodge

Grass

Elementary

School,

a

public

school located on land owned by the state, but within the

·'J

exterior

boundaries of

the Crow Reservation.

Through a

guardian, Sage brought suit against the school district in
a

Crow

Tribal

Court,

claiming

substantial

damages.

Process was served on the School Board Chairman who, for
unknown reasons,
been

brought.

failed to notify anyone that a suit had
Neither

the

school

authorities

nor

its

·.

2.

insurer,
notice

National

and

Farmers

therefore

a

Union

default

Insurance
judgment of

Company,

had

$153,000 was

taken 21 days after service of process.
This suit was instituted
an

injunction

judgment.

against

Following

a

the

in federal court to obtain
execution

hearing

of

the

on defendant's

default

motion

to

dismiss, the DC granted a permanent injunction against any

t.:t

execut}1on of the Tribal Court judgment, holding that

~s

court

tort

lacked

"subject matter

jurisdiction over

the

that was the basis of the default judgment".
The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed the
DC, and held that since a Tribal Court was the first and
last arbiter of its own jurisdiction, a federal court had
no jurisdiction under 28
"ajudicatory

u.s.c.

§1331 to intrude upon the

jurisdiction asserted by Tribal Courts even

in a civil tort action involving non-Indians, and arising
upon on-Indian lands located within the boundaries of an
Indian Reservation."
Petitioners

argue

that

the

"ability

of

states

to

conduct their governmental functions in an orderly fashion
is at stake" in this case.

The Court of

~ppeals

holding that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

erred in

u.s.

49,

makes a Tribal Court the first and last arbiter of its own

3.

jurisdiction in tort cases - even those arising on stateowned land and involving state operated activities such as
the school district.

Petitioners say that the question at

issue is "not governed by any single federal statute, but
is based on federal common law.

A claim based on federal

common law is included in 'laws' of the United States for
purpose of federal jurisdiction under §1331.
City of Milwaukee,
CA9

cases

decision)
decide

406

(apparently

u.s.

91.

in

Illinois v.

Petitioners briefs cites

conflict

with

its

present

that recognize/ the right of federal courts to

questions

whether

jurisdiction over

a

non-Indians.

Tribe
Even

has

exceeded

though

there

its
is no

federal statute defining the extent of Tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians,

federal court jurisdiction exists under

§1333, based on principles

~

of federal common

law.
Respondents argue

that

the "power to decide federal

common law questions is limited" generally by the intent
of

Congress

with

respect

intends to foster
district
over

court,

in

to

use

Indian

affairs.

"Congress

Indian self-government'" by forbidding a
effect,

the Tribal Court.

authority

to

the

to

become

a

appellate

court

A federal district court has no
injunction

power

to

cripple

and

4.

nulify the orderly functions of the Tribal Court system •

..r

In any event, respondent say that federal court review is
1\

not available until Tribal remedies are exhausted.
these

principles,

it

is

said,

were

violated

All of
by

the

district court in this case.

~n~history
that

the

Tribe held

of the "Crow Nation" makes clear

and properly exercised

jurisdiction

over torts of non-Indians against Crows from the earliest
times until the commencement of this case.
this

case

was

committed

by

a

The tort in

non-Indian

riding

a

motorcycle that hit the plaintiff.
As Annmar ie knows from our work on Oneida,
authority on Indian law.
directly conferring

I am no

If there is no federal statute

jurisdiction on the federal court,

I

would think that federal common law includes - or should
include

the

authority

enforcement of a
local

I

a

federal

court

to

enjoin

judgment by the Tribal Court against a

subdivision of

differently,

of

the

would

State of Montana.

doubt

jurisdiction to impose a

that

a

Tribal

Putting
Court

it
has

judgment on the state or one of
(/Yo-

its

political

subdivisions

_yf

a

tort

against

an

committed by a non-Indian on state-owned property.
Rehnquist,

in granting

a

stay

in

this

case,

Indian
Bill

apparently

5.

said that the decision of CA9 appears to leave the state
and

its

insurer

with

"no

federal

court

remedy

of

any

kind".
It seems to me that the question is somewhat clearer
if

viewed

in

terms

of

the

jursidiction

of

the

Tribal

Court, rather than that of the federal district court.
thoughts are entirely tentative,
in the views of my law clerk.
LFP, JR.

and

I will be

My

intersted

i

~ '1/7

aml 04/05/85

h/d.L ~~
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Annmarie

Re :

No • 8 4-3 2 0

April 5, 1985

Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. et al v. Crow Tribe et al

Questions Presented
(1)
Indian

Does

tribal

a

federal

court

court

proceedings

have

jurisdiction

against

a

to

non-Indian

enjoin
on

ground that the tribal court has exceeded its jurisdiction?
(2)

Should a non-Indian plaintiff be required to

the

;1;:-~

e~

tribal court remedies before challenging the jurisdiction of the
tribal court in federal court?
(3)

Did

exercising civil

the

tribal

court

jurisdiction over

exceed

its

non-Indians

authority

by

in an action to

2.

redress personal injuries to a member of the tribe whose injuries
allegedly

were

caused

by

the

negligence

of

school

district

officials on State-owned land within the tribe's reservation?

~~~--~~~)~~~~)/~
.

Background

In May 1982,
Tribe,

was

C. f ~ ~

.

Leroy Sage, a minor and member of the Crow

injured by a motorcycle on the grounds of a school

operated by School District No.
the State of Montana.

27,

a political subdivision of

Although the land on which the school was

located is owned by the State, it is within a reservation held by
the Crows.

Sage's guardian sued the school district in the Crow

tribal court seeking $3,000 in actual damages and
pain

and

The

suffering.

district was negligent

complaint

in that

alleged

$150,000 for

that

the

school

the condition of the school

parking lot was unsafe and that it was inadequately supervised
during

school

chairman

of

hours.

the

Process

school

was

served

district,

notify anyone else of the suit.

who

properly

upon

inexplicably

the

failed

to

As a result, in October, 1982, a

default judgment in the amount of $153,000 was entered against
the school district in the tribal court.

~~

~

t"Q.
fV L.

J'udgment,

On

November
the

2,

1982,

having

school district

and

received

its

notice

insurance

of

this

company

filed

-

suit in federal district court alleging that the tribal court
did
..-......
not have subject matter

f)t, DC

agreed

and

permanently

court's

judgment.

federal

court

-

jurisdiction over the controversy.

On

cannot

enjoined

appeal,
enjoin

CA9

tribal

enforcement
reversed,
court

of

the

holding

--

proceedings.

~

The ~

tribal
that

a CJ4<1

Judge

Wright concurred in the result on the ground that petrs should

3.

have

exhausted

their

tribal

court

remedies

before

seeking

intervention by the DC.
On
tribal

August

court

1,

1984,

issued

a

shortly

writ

of

after

CA9's

execution

for

decision,
the

the

seizure

of

certain property of the school district. Sale of the property was
scheduled

for

August

On

23.

,1;

August

22,

the

school

district

,,

appeared in ~fi8s l court seeking to enjoin the sale and set aside
the

default

On

judgment.

the

same

day,

the

tribal

court

postponed the sale and set a hearing to consider the motion to
vacate

the

default

appearance
Justice

· 'J-1 /(

in

tribal

Rehnquist

he continued

court,

for

Rehnquist granted a

'(J:v~~ lO,

At

judgment.

the

about

the

school

same

district

an emergency stay of

the

temporary stay on August

the

stay

until

time

as

applied

to

Justice

sale.

21.

its

On September

the disposition of the school

district's proceedings before this Court.

Nine days later,

the

tribal court postponed ruling on the motion to vacate the default
judgment until final disposition by this Court.
Discussion
I. Jurisdiction of the Federal DC.

-

The DC held that it had jurisdiction to entertain petrs'
action for injunctive relief under 28
view,

petrs

raised

question was
Milwaukee,

a

question

cognizable

406

u.s.

91,

of

under

federal

§1331

99-100

u.s.c.

§1331.
common

under

(1972}.

In

In the DC's

law

Illinois

and

v.

particular,

this

City of
the DC

believed that petrs placed in issue "the extent of tribal court
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians as developed by the Supreme
Court

in

Montana

v.

United

States,

450

u.s.

544

(1981}

4.

developments

that

are

not

drawn

from

any

specific

statute or

treaty, but raise the overriding federal interest in determining
the extent of

tribal

federal common law."

sovereignty and

therefore

form a part of

Pet. App. at 17a.

I think this theory of jurisdiction is persuasive.

As you

noted in Oneida, regulation of, and relations with, Indian tribes
are

matters

exclusively

government.

within

the

power

of

the

federal

Indian tribes relinquished the absolute sovereignty

they enjoyed as independent nations upon their incorporation into
the United States.

Accordingly, whatever judicial, legislative,

-----------~---------or other authority Indian tribes retain
is a matter of determined
by federal law.
This Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish
---'--'
Indian Tribe, 435 u.s. 191 (1978), indicated that these retained
powers

are

treaties
prohibited

q

~

with

their

not

limited

only

congressional

or
as

well

from

status."

by

the

enactments.

exercising

Id.,

specific

at

208.

~

of~

in Illinois v.

law.

Indian

those

powers

Thus,

~hallenge to~~ct~ tribal

restrictions

I

tribes

in
are

"inconsistent

conclude

that

a

court raises a question

As the DC correctly noted, the Court held

City of Milwaukee,

supra,

based on federal common law arise under

that causes of action
the laws of the United

States for purposes of §1331 jurisdiction.
The one nagging question I have about the jurisdiction of
DC in this case is whether petrs really raised a question of
federal common law in the DC.

____

____..
Their original complaint
asserted

jurisdiction only on the basis of §1343 and 25
Indian Civil Rights Act or

"ICRA"),

u.s.c.

§1302 (the

although it was amended to

~

5.

allege

jurisdiction

under

§1331

as

Petrs'

well.

substantive

claims read as follows:
14. The defendants lack jurisdiction over nonIndian fee land premises conducting business with
substantial
contracts
[sic]
outside
the
exterior
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation . .
15. The attempted assertion of the jurisdiction
over plaintiffs under the circumstances hereinabove
described
and
by
the
procedures
invoked
by
the
defendants violate the provisions of 25 U. S.C. §1302
and of the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States.

b<
~

~~~::tt

.6-

~~

f4tL
~

~~

~

The DC took paragraph 14 to assert a

-

claim.

I think it is more plausible to read paragraphs 14 and 15

together so
ICRA

that petrs actually assert only constitutional and
If

claims.

constitutional
would

federal common law

require

petrs

claims,
a

did

the

different

only

raise

question
analysis.

of

the

statutory

DC's

and

jurisdiction

In particular,

the

Court

would have to take account of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436

u.s.

49

(1978).

by

"unconstrained
specifically

Martinez

as

those

reaffirmed

that

Indian

constitutional

limitations

on

federal

tribes

provisions
or

state

framed

authority,"

citing as examples the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
56.

are

Id., at

Martinez also held that the only relief federal courts may

offer for violations of the ICRA's guarantees of equal protection
and due process is that provided by the statute, namely the writ
of habeas corpus.

While Martinez could be distinguished because

it involved a suit by an Indian against the Tribe, the case was
not analyzed from this perspective below. Thus I'm not sure what
the

proper

disposition

would

be

at

this

point

if

the

Court

~ .b-0 ci- c/1--61
~~)~
decided

that

the

common

law

basis

for

jurisdiction

was

not ~
.....,

presented.
Since

the

litigation

has

come

this

far,

however,

it

probably makes sense simply to accept the DC's characterization
of paragraph
This

as

14

raising

interpretation

is

a

not

question

of

unreasonable

federal
and

common

CA9

law.

reached

question of jurisdiction over a common law cause of action.
I think the Court probably
Finally,

I

~

the
Thus

do so as well.

~hould

should address

the CA9 majority's

theory for

why the DC does not have jurisdiction over a common law challenge
to

the

extent

of

reasoned

that

invoked

sparingly.

tribal

federal

"manifest purpose"

court

common
Since

law
this

jurisdiction.
is

an

Court

unusual
held

The

majority

course,
that

to be

Congress'

in adopting the ICRA was to limit intrusions

by the federal courts on tribal adjudication, Martinez, 436

u.s.,

at 67-70,

it would violate federal policy to recognize a common C~~

law

of

cause

court believed

action
that

"causes of action"

to

enjoin

federal

tribal

court

proceedings.

The

courts should decline to recognize

in addition to the limited remedies provided

in the ICRA. l

1 The majority unpersuasively attempts to distinguish its

own prior dec1s1ons recogn1z1ng the right of federal courts to
rule on claims that tribal courts exceeded their jurisdiction.
According to the majority, those cases involved challenges to the
civil "regulatory" jurisdiction of the tribes and not their
"adjudicatory" jurisdiction. Not only do the cases fail to__Jllake
this distinction, but I don't think the distinction makes any
sense.
In tne previous cases, 'fhere was an lawsuit penaing in
ttThal court. The policy of not intruding on tribal courts was
implicated as much in these challenges~ "regulatory" authority as
Footnote continued on next page.

c~e;~~
~~)s

7.

This reasoning is not persuasive, I believe, for a number
of

reasons.

The

ICRA

does

not

purport

jurisdiction of the tribal courts.

to

define

As a result,

the

civil

I don't think

there is any plausible way to read the ICRA to preempt the common
law

of

tribal

court

The

jurisdiction.

Court's

decision

in

Oliphant makes clear that the extent of the tribal court's civil
jurisdiction

is

at

least

in part a

question of

federal common

law, and nothing in the ICRA changes that.

~~

The question of appropriate relief is a separate matter.

~e ~ provided
the

legality

tribe."

of

[a

by the statute is availi>ble "to test

person's]

by

order

of

an

Indian

I think it is clear that this remedy is not intended to

apply to civil proceedings.
for

detention

common

law

wrongs

different problem.

There is no reason to limit relief
----------------~-~

/"'

to· statutory

remedies

addressed

to

a

Thus even if the habeas remedy of the ICRA is

the exclusive remedy for statutory violations, this doesn't mean
that petrs raising a common law cause of action are limited to
this remedy.
In sum,

I

would

find

that the DC had

jurisdiction under

'--------------~----~------~------~-------

§1331 to consider petrs' federal common law claim that the tribal
court exceeded its jurisdiction.
~-------------~--------

II. Exhaustion

Although I believe that the federal court has jurisdiction

in this challenge to adjudicatory authority. More significantly,
as Judge Wright notes in concurrence, there is no reason for
federal court jurisdiction to turn on the source of the tribal
rule being adjudicated in tribal court.

~~~~
a-k-~ ~1-J.:.
in this case, I think there is a very stron
should

have

abstained

from exercising its jurisdiction
-----As this
their tribal court remedies.

-------~-

petrs

argument that the

exhausted

DC~

until
....
Court

__.__,_,_,

recognized, Congress has sought to strengthen tribal institutions
and

intended

Martinez,

tribal

u.s.

436

courts

49.

to

promote

It is hard

tribal

self-government.

to think of an action more

likely to insult and undermine tribal courts than a federal court
injunction

against

its

proceedings,

granted

to

plaintiffs who

never gave the tribal court the opportunity to rule on its own
As a matter of federal policy and comity,

jurisdiction.

then,

federal courts should hesitate to intervene in circumstances like
these.
As

-

Judge Wright

reasoned

in his concurrence,

exhaustion

need not be an inflexible requirement in this area of the law,
but should be applied when there are meaningful tribal remedies

------------

available and exhaustion serves to promote comity and strengthen
tribal institutions.
Indeed,

the

tribal

In this case, such remedies are available.
court was willing

to entertain petrs

1

late

motion to vacate the default judgment after CA9 1 s decision until
the petrs sought Justice Rehnquist 1 s
then,

I

think

requi~ing

intervention.

On balance,

petrs to exhaust tribal court remedies

well serves federal policy.

--------

III. Extent of Tribal Jurisdiction
CA9 did not reach the question whether

the tribal court

had jurisdiction over the underlying tort case.
exhaustion should

be

required

in

this case,

I

Because I think
don 1 t

think

the

9.

Court need reach the question.

I will offer some thoughts on the

issue in case the Court does wish to address it.
It is well established that tribal courts have some civil
regulatory

-

and

reservations,

even

u.s.

450

States,

"udicial

jurisdiction over

on

544,

non-Indian

565

u.s.

non-Indians on

lands.

(1981):

Montana

Washington

v.

v.

their
United

Confederated

134 (1980): Williams v. Lee, 358

u.s.

Colville Tribes,

447

217, 223 (1959).

This jurisdiction is "attributable in no way to

any delegation of federal authority," United States v. Wheeler,

u.s.

435

313,

328

(1978),

but

rather

represents

retained by tribes despite their dependent status.

authority

v

In Montana v.

United States, the Court laid out this description of the extent
of

tribal

jurisdiction

over

non-Indians

on

non-Indian

lands

within a reservation:
"A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other ~t~
arrangements.
• A tribe may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe." 450 u.s., at 566
(citations omitted).
The DC decided that a single tort did not involve the kind
of tribal interests that are within the jurisdiction of the tribe
to protect.
view.

The SG argues
__., strenuously that the tribal court does have

--

jurisdiction.
that

Neither the DC nor petrs provide authority for this

the

Since

school

the

district

allegation
was

in

negligent

the
in

underlying
that

suit

is

it maintained

dangerous conditions in the school parking lot, in the SG's view,

10.

the case implicates tribal health and welfare interests directly
enough to warrant the exercise of its adjudicatory jurisdiction.
agree with the SG's conclusion.

I

the

tribe's

interests

could regulate,

probably

significant

at least to some extent,

___....,

operation of

are

After all, I think that

_...._

the parking lot.

enough

that

it

the school district's
~

For example,

the tribe probably

could require the presence of a school crossing guard or special
bus stops, just as it can require non-Indians to meet health and
safety

standards

in

the operation of

Indian land within the reservation.

their

businesses on non-

Montana v.

United States.

2

Thus, if the Court reaches the question whether the tribal court
had jurisdiction over the dispute, I would hold that it did.
Recommendation
I

recommend~eversing

CA9's

holding

that

without jurisdiction to entertain petrs' complaint.
that

the@ DC

jurisdiction,
remedies.

should

have

however,

Likewise,

I

until

the
I

DC

would hold

abstained

from

exercising

petrs

exhausted

their

thi ~this

Court

should

was

refrain

its

tribal
from

passing on the question of the tribal court's jurisdiction until
the tribal court has the opportunity to do so.

2 The regulatory authority of the tribe in this case is a
little more complicated because the school is operated by "a
political subdivision of the State of Montana." I don't think
this affects the question of adjudicatory authority, however,
because of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity adopted by
statute in Montana.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-320

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES AND LODGE GRASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 27,
PETITIONERS v. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]

JUSTICE STEVENS d~livered the opinion for the Court.
A member of the Crow Tribe of Indians filed suit against
the Lodge Grass School District No. 27 (School District) in
the Crow Tribal Court and obtained a default judgment.
Thereafter, the School District and its insurer, National
Farmers Union Insurance Companies (National), commenced
this litigation in the District Court for the District of Montana; that court was persuaded that the Crow Tribal Court
had no jurisdiction over a civil action against a non-Indian
and entered an injunction against further proceedings in the
Tribal Court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the District Court had no jurisdiction to enter such an injunction. We granted certiorari to consider whether the District
Court properly entertained petitioners' request for an injunction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.
The facts as found by the District Court are not substantially disputed. bn May 27, 1982, Leroy Sage, a Crow Indian minor, was struck by a motorcycle in the Lodge Grass
Elementary School parking lot while returning from a school
activity. The school has a student body that is 85% Crow
Indian and is located within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. However, the land on which the school is
located is owned by the State, with a mineral reservation
held by the Crow Tribe. Through his guardian, Flora Not

_ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Afraid, Sage initiated a lawsuit in the Crow Tribal Court
against the School District, a political subdivision of the
State, alleging damages of $153,000, including medical expenses of $3,000 and pain and suffering of $150,000.
On September 28, 1982, process was served by Dexter
Falls Down on Wesley Falls Down, the Chairman of the
School Board. For reasons that have not been explained,
Wesley Falls Down failed to notify anyone that a suit had
been filed. On October 19, 1982, a default judgment was
entered pursuant to the rules of the Tribal Court, and on·
October 25, 1982, Judge Roundface entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law and a judgment for $153,000 against the
School District. Sage v. Lodge Grass School District, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6019 (1982). A copy of that judgment was
hand-delivered by Wesley Falls Down to the school principal
who, in turn, forwarded it to National on October 29, 1982.
On November 3, 1982, National and the School District
(petitioners) filed a verified complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order in the District Court for the District
of Montana. The complaint named as defendants the Crow
Tribe of Indians, the Tribal Council, the Tribal Court, Judges
of the Court and the Chairman of the Tribal Council. It described the entry of the default judgment, alleged that a writ
of execution might issue on the following day, and asserted
that a seizure of school property would cause irreparable injury to the School District and would violate the petitioners'
constitutional and statutory rights. The District Court entered an order restraining all the defendants "from attempting to assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs or issuing writs of
execution out of Cause No. Civ. 82-287 of the Crow Tribal
Court until this court orders otherwise." 1
In subsequent proceedings, the petitioners filed an amendment to their co¥lplaint, invoking 28 U. S. C. § 1331 as a
' Certified Record, Document No. 6.
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basis for federal jurisdiction, 2 and added Flora Not Afraid
and Leroy Sage as parties defendant. After the temporary
restraining order expired, a hearing was held on the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and on the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 29, 1982,
the District Court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against any execution of the Tribal Court judgment.
National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow
Tribe of Indians of Montana, 560 F. Supp. 213, 218 (D.
Mont. 1983). The basis "for the injunction was that the
Crow Tribal Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
the tort that was the basis of the default judgment." I d.,
at 214.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 736 F. 2d 1320 (1984). Without reaching the
merits of petitioners' challenge to the jurisdiction of the
Tribal Court, the majority concluded that the District Court's
exercise of jurisdiction could not be supported on any constitutional, statutory or common-law ground. I d., at 13221323. 3 One judge dissented in part and concurred in the result, expressing the opinion that petitioners stated a federal
common-law cause of action involving a substantial federal
2
!d., Document No. 14. In their original complaint, petitioners relied
on 25 U.. S. C. § 1302 and on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 as bases for federal
jurisdiction.
3
The Court of Appeals believed that the petitioners' due process and
equal protection claims had no merit because Indian tribes are not constrained by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, although recognizing that the Tribe is bound by the Indian Civil Rights Act,
25 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1341, the Court of Appeals held that a federal court
has no jurisdiction to enjoin violations of that Act. See Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978). Finally, although the majority
assumed that a complaint alleging that a Tribe had abused its regulatory
jurisdiction would state a claim arising under federal common-law, it concluded that a claim that a Tribe had abused its adjudicatory jurisdiction
could not be recognized because Congress, by enacting the Indian Civil
Rights Act, had specifically restricted federal court interference with
Tribal Court proceedings to review on petition for habeas corpus.
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question over which subject-matter jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1331. He concluded, however, that
the petitioners had a duty to exhaust their tribal court remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court, and
therefore concurred in the judgment directing that the complaint be dismissed. /d., at 1324-1326. 4
I

Section 1331 of the Judicial Code provides that a federal
district court "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." 5 It is well settled that this statutory
grant of "jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin." 6
Federal common law as articulated in rules that are fashioned
by court decisions are "laws" as that term is used in § 1331. 7
'After the District Court's injunction was vacated, tribal officials issued
a writ of execution ol) August 1, 1984, and seized computer terminals,
other computer equipment, and a truck from the School District. A sale of
the property was scheduled for August 22, 1984. On that date, the School
District appeared in the Tribal Court, attempting to enjoin the sale and to
set aside the default judgment. Br. in Opp. App. 1a-9a. The Tribal
Court stated that it could not addr~ss the default-judgment issue "without
a full hearing, research, and briefs by counsel," id., at 4a; that it would
consider a proper motion to set aside the default judgment; and that the
sale should be postponed. Petitioners also proceeded before the Court of
Appeals, which denied an emergency motion to recall the mandate on August 20, 1984. The next day JUSTICE REHNQUIST granted the petitioners'
application for a temporary stay. On September 10, 1984, he continued
the stay pending disposition of the petitioners' petition for certiorari.
- - U. S. - - (1984). On September 19, the Tribal Court entered an
order postponing a ruling on the motion to set aside the default judgment
until after final review by this Court. Br. in Opp. App. 15a. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed all proceedings
in the District Court. On April 24, 1985, JuSTICE REHNQUIST denied an
application to "dissolve" the Court of Appeals' stay. - - U. S. - (1985).
5
28 u. s. c. § 1331.
6
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 100 (1972).
7
See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
392-393 (1959) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); cf. 9ounty of Onieda v. Onieda
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Thus, in order to invoke a federal district court's jurisdiction under § 1331, it was not essential that the petitioners
base their claim on a federal statute or a provision of the Constitution. It was, however, necessary to assert a claim
"arising under" federal law. As Justice Holmes wrote for
the Court, a "suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action." 8 Petitioners contend that the right which they
assert-a right to be protected against an unlawful exercise
of tribal court judicial power-has its source in federal law
because federal law defines the outer boundaries of an Indian
tribe's power over non-Indians.
As we have often noted, Indian tribes occupy a unique status under our law. 9 At one time they exercised virtually
unlimited power over their own members as well as those
who were permitted to join their communities. Today, however, the power of the federal government over the Indian
tribes is plenary. 1° Federal law, implemented by statute, by
treaty, by administrative regulations, and by judicial deCisions, provides significant protection for the individual, territorial and political rights of the Indian tribes: The tribes
also retain some of the inherent powers of the self-governing
political communities that were formed long before Europeans first settled in North America. lr
Indian Tribe,- U . S . - , - (1985); Texas Industries v. Radcliff
Mterials, 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981); United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 593-592 (1973); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
u. s. 64, 78-79 (1938).
8
American Well Works v. Layne, 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1915).
9
See, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975); cf. Turner v. United States,
248 u. s. 354, 354-355 (1919).
10
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual,
Pauma and Banks of Mission Indians,- U . S . - , - (1984) ("all
aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress");
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 719 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143 (1980); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S.
313, 323 (1978).
11
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980);
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 55-56 (1978).
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This Court has frequently been required to decide questions concerning the extent to which Indian tribes have retained the power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians. 12 We
have also been confronted with a series of questions concerning the extent to which a tribe's power to engage in commerce has included an immunity from state taxation. 13 In all
of these cases, the governing rule of decision has been provided by federal law. In this case the petitioners contend
that the tribal court has no power to enter a judgment
against them. Assuming that the power to resolve disputes
arising within the territory governed by the Tribe was once
an attibute of inherent tribal sovereignty, the petitioners, in
essence, contend that the Tribe has to some extent been divested of this aspect of sovereignty. More particularly,
when they invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court under
§ 1331, they must contend that federal law has curtailed the
powers of the Tribe, and thus afforded them the basis for the
relief they seek in a federal forum.
The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to
compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by
reference to federal law and is a "federal question" under
§ 1331. 14 Because petitioners contend that federal law has di12

Thus, in recent years we have decided whether a tribe has the power
to regulate the sale of liquor on a reservation, Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S.
713 (1983); the power to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production
by non-Indian lessees, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130
(1982); the power to regulate hunting and fishing, Montana v. United
States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Department of
Game, 433 U. S. 165 (1977); and the power to tax the sale of cigarettes to
non-Indians, Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980).
18
See, e. g., Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); cf.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136 (1980).
14
We have recognized that federal law has sometimes diminished the inherent power of Indian tribes in significant ways. As we stated in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322-326 (1978):

i
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vested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal
law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted right of
freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, therefore, filed an action "arising under" federal law within the
meaning of § 1331. The District Court correctly concluded
that a federal court may determine under § 1331 whether a
tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction.
II
Respondents' contend that, even though the District
Court's jurisdiction was properly invoked under § 1331, the
Court of Appeals was correct in ordering that the complaint
be dismissed because the petitioners failed to exhaust their
remedies in the tribal judicial system. They further assert
that the underlying tort action "has turned into a procedural
and jurisdictional nightmare" because petitioners did not pursue their readily available Tribal Court remedies. Petitioners, in response, relying in part on Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (1978), assert that resort to exhaustion as a matter of comity "is manifestly inappropriate."
In Oliphant we held that the Suquamish Indian Tribal
Court did not have criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish
non-Indians for offenses committed on the Reservation.
"Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their
acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of
the sovereignty which they had previously exercised. . . . In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to
have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe .... Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely
alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. Oneida Indian Nation v.
M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574. They cannot enter into direct commercial or
governmental relations with foreign nations. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet.
515, 559; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., at 17-18; Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87, 147 (Johnson, J., concurring). And, as we have recently held,
they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe [435 U. S. 191 (1978)]."
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That holding adopted the reasoning of early opinions of two
United States Attorneys General, 15 and concluded that federallegislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to
try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had
implicitly pre-empted tribal jurisdiction. We wrote:
"While Congress never expressly forbade Indian tribes
to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now
make express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century
ago that Congress consistently believed this to be the
necessary result of its repeated legislative actions." 435
U. S., at 204. "
If we were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that
any exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed
because federal courts would always be the only forums for
civil actions against non-Indians. For several reasons,
m or8e'le~the reasoning of Oliphant does not apply to this
case. First, although Congress' decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by
non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country supported
the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes
between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation.16 Moreover, the opinion of one Attorney General
16

We stated:
"Faced by attempts of the Chocktaw Tribe to try non-Indian offenders in
the early 1800's the United States Attorneys General also concluded that
the Choctaws did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent
congressional authority. See 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op. Atty.
Gen. 174 (1855). According to the Attorney General in 1834, tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is, inter alia, inconsistent with treaty
provisions recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the territory assigned to the Indian nation and the dependence of the Indians on the
United States" 435 U. S., at 198-199.
14
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 253 (1982) ("The development of principles governing civil jurisdiction in Indian Country has been
markedly different from the development of rules dealing with criminal
jurisdiction").
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on which we relied in Oliphant, specifically noted the difference between civil and criminal jurisdiction. Speaking of
civil jurisdiction, Attorney General Cushing wrote :
"But there is no provision of treaty, and no statute,
which takes away from the Choctaws jurisdiction of a
case like this, a question of property strictly internal to
the Chocktaw nation; nor is there any written law which
confers jurisdiction of such a case in any court of the
United States ....
The conclusion seems to me irresistible, not that such
questions are justiciable no where, but that they remain
subject to the local jurisdiction of the Chocktaws.
Now, it is admitted on all hands . . . that Congress has
'paramount right' to legislate in regard to this question,
in all its relations. It has legislated, in so far as it saw
fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal matters, and omit-·
ting to take jurisdiction in civil matters. . . . By all
possible rules of construction the inference is clear that
jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves of civil
controversies arising strictly within the Chocktaw Nation." 7 Op. Att'y Gen.~, at 179:....181 (emphasis added). 17
Thus, we conclude that the answer to the question whether
a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject-matter
jurisdiction over non-Indians in a case of this kind is not automatically forclosed, as an extension of Oliphant would re17

A leading treatise on Indian law suggests strongly that Congress has
had a similar understanding:
"In the civil field, however, Congress has never enacted general legislation
to supply a federal or state forum for disputes between Indians and nonIndians in Indian country. Furthermore, although treaties between the
federal government and Indian tribes sometimes required the tribes to surrender non-Indian criminal offenders to state or federal authorities, Indian
treaties did not contain provision for tribal relinquishment of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians." !d., at 253-254.
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quire. 18 Rather, the existence and extent of a tribal court's
jurisdiciton will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested or diminished, 19 as well as a detailed study
of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in
treaties and elsewhere, and adminstrative or judicial
decisions.
We believe that examination should be conducted in the
first instance in the Tribal Court itself. Our cases have often
recognized that Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination. 20 That
policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate
the factual and legal bases for the challenge. 21 Moreover the
orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be
served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal
Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed. 22 The risks of the kind of "pro18

Cf. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee,
u. s. 217 (1959).
19
See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 137
(1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 u. s. 134, 152 (1980).
'
00
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 332 (1983);
Merrion v. Jacarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 138, n. 5 (1982); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143-144 & n. 10 (1980);
Morton v. Mancuri, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S.
217, 223 (1959).
21
We do not suggest that exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction "is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted
in bad faith," cf. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 338 (1977), or where the
action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where
exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge the court's jurisdiction.
22
Four days after receiving notice of the default judgment, petitioners
requested that the Di~trict Court enter an injunction. Crow Tribal Court
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d) provides that a party in a default may move
to set aside the default judgment at any time within 30 days. App. 17.
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cedural nightmare" that has allegedly developed in this case
will be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after
the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its
own jurisdiction 23 and to rectify any errors it may have
made. 24 Exhaustion of Tribal Court remedies, moreover,
will encourage Tribal Courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review. 25

III
Our conclusions that § 1331 encompasses the federal question whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of
its jurisdiction, and that exhaustion is required before such a
claim may be entertained by a federal court, require that we
reverse the of the Court of Appeals. Until petitioners have
exhausted the remedies available to them in the tribal court
system, supra, n. 4, it would be premature for a federal court
to consider any relief. Whether the federal action should be
dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending the development of further .Tribal Court proceedings, is a question that
should be addressed in the first instance by the District
Court. Accordingly, the judgment-of the Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so Ordered.
"'·

Petitioners did not utilize this legal remedy. It is a fundamental principle
of longstanding that a request for an injunction will not be granted as long
as an adequate remedy at law is available. See, e. g., Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 57 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 88
(1974).
28
C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 16 (1976).
24
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975).
28
Weinberger v. Saifi,, 422 U. S., at 765; see, e. g., North Dakota ex rel.
Wefald v. Kelly, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (1983); Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v.
Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6031 (1983).
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